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Ec o n o m i s t s  monitoring the move toward a mar-ket economy in Central and Eastern Europe 
have focused on macroeconomic goals, such as the 
development of financial, regulatory, and legal in-
frastructures; the transfer of public property to pri-
vate sector owners; and currency stabilization and 
convertibility. From a marketing channels perspec-
tive, all of these issues are important in facilitating 
the development of channels that meet consumer 
needs, encourage economic development and rein-
vestment, and provide linkages to external markets. 
As Savitt (1992) suggests in the context of privatiza-
tion, however, current analyses place too much em-
phasis on overall economic outcomes, particularly 
the development of markets, at the expense of at-
tention to the process of achieving these goals. It is 
important to understand the process of market de-
velopment to explain differences in the rate and di-
rection of social and economic change. 
In evaluating the public policies driving institu-
tional changes in Central and Eastern Europe, sev-
eral recent articles have advocated a Shumpete-
rian perspective, which suggests that it is better to 
build on existing skills, history, and values than to 
try to eradicate the old ways completely and start 
with new institutions, norms, and personnel (Mur-
rell 1992; Nason, Carman, and Dholakia 1992; Vo-
szka 1991). For Central and Eastern Europe, this 
means that along with existing cultural values and 
managerial skills comes the “baggage” of the old 
way of doing business, including the social net-
works among managers that resulted in decisions 
based on personal outcomes rather than organi-
zational efficiency and effectiveness (Economist 
1995a,1995b; Nagy 1993; Voszka 1991). 
This phenomenon of social networks and the re-
sulting outcomes can be called interest domina-
tion; this article contends that it is one factor that 
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Abstract
Changes in political and economic power can affect channel structures and decisions. Western 
channel models may not be useful for understanding the process of change in Central and East Eu-
ropean transforming economies. This discussion suggests that channels in transforming economies 
may be controlled by groups or networks of people with mutual interests, a phenomenon the au-
thors call interest domination. The article examines interest domination by managers, Communist 
cadres, and other party elite in two transforming economies and describes how structural and be-
havioral components of command economies might be conducive to interest domination of market-
ing channels. Propositions for explaining the political, social, and economic factors that sustain in-
terest domination and contribute to change in interest-dominated channels are offered. Examples 
from Hungary and Tajikistan are used to provide context for the discussion.  
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can accelerate or retard change in transforming 
economies. Investigating and understanding inter-
est-dominated channels in transforming economies 
may help Western marketers examine channel op-
erations and social effects in an environment whose 
political, economic, and social experiences and val-
ues may differ from those used to model Western 
channel issues. 
The objective herein is to provide a framework 
for understanding channel changes taking place in 
transforming economies. The article views channel 
structure as composed of relationships embedded 
in a historical, political, and personal context. The 
process of change is premised on a context in which 
these social networks of shared interests have re-
sulted in high barriers to entry for local entrepre-
neurs, with the consequence being limited diffusion 
of accumulated wealth across social groups. Based 
on an examination of two countries in different 
stages of economic and market development (Hun-
gary and Tajikistan), explanations of how social, po-
litical, and economic changes affect changes in dis-
tribution systems are proposed. Understanding how 
such countries as Hungary are developing a market 
and channel structure can help researchers under-
stand and guide the process in countries like Tajiki-
stan, which lag behind in both market and economic 
development. 
The discussion is presented in three sections. 
The first introduces the concept of interest dom-
ination in marketing channels and provides a 
theoretical base. Drawing on existing theoreti-
cal models in the network, political economy, and 
ethnodomination literatures, the authors present 
interest domination as a context-specific gover-
nance structure. The next section uses two coun-
tries with transitional economies, Hungary and Ta-
jikistan, as examples to describe the development 
of interest domination. This section examines how 
interest domination is developed and sustained, 
then addresses the issue of how interest-domi-
nated channels change. The final section of the ar-
ticle discusses how interest domination contributes 
to an understanding of the process of transforma-
tion and economic development. 
Interest Domination 
Interest domination is the control of distribution 
channels in a specific industry or geographic area, or 
both, by an isolated group of economic actors. This 
dominant group controls resources and concentrates 
power to the extent that an insider/outsider culture 
develops. Outsiders have limited access to capital 
and ownership opportunities. Insiders usually share 
a common background, common values, or common 
experiences that set them farther apart from other in-
dividuals or groups. The focus of this article is groups 
of former Communist cadres, political elite, or enter-
prise managers under command regimes. 
The theoretical base for interest domination is 
drawn from three streams of research: the political 
economy framework, network theory, and the soci-
ological concept of ethnodomination. Political econ-
omy models contribute the motivation and environ-
mental variables. Network theory focuses on the 
group and promotes understanding of how relation-
ships among individuals produce trust and provide 
transaction value. The concept of ethnodomination 
provides the basis of a framework for relating inter-
est domination to environmental change. The Fig-
ure illustrates how interest domination draws from 
these three research streams. 
Political Economy Framework 
In marketing, the political economy framework has 
been used to examine the interplay between power 
distribution and resource allocation within a chan-
nel of distribution. According to this approach, a 
channel of distribution represents a political econ-
omy in which, as Benson (1975) notes, the primary 
concern is ‘’the distribution of two scarce resources, 
money and authority” (p. 229). Relatively less atten-
tion has been given, however, to the application of 
the framework on a macro level (Robicheaux and 
Coleman 1994), where the channel of distribution is 
analyzed as embedded within economic and politi-
cal institutions. 
Arndt (1981, 1983) characterizes political econ-
omy as an institutional approach to market-
ing, meaning that the focus is on the rules and 
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conditions that govern transactions. Again, these 
rules can develop within a channel of distribution 
as a function of political and economic conditions, 
such as the relationship between the use of power 
and market conditions (Frazier and Kale 1989). 
The rules and conditions can also arise from gov-
ernmental regulations that directly or indirectly af-
fect distribution channels or from historical or cul-
tural norms affecting the distribution of political 
and economic power. According to Arndt (1981), po-
litical economy “links economic processes to orga-
nizational structure and goals and the influence of 
important stakeholder groups” (p. 40). In the con-
text of a transitional economy, political economy al-
lows the analysis of channel development to go be-
yond the effects of the change from a sellers’ to a 
buyers’ market by incorporating variables relating 
to political elements both internal and external to 
the channel. 
The political economy framework serves two 
functions for the purposes of this discussion. 
First, it is sensitive to environmental change, 
in both the economic (resource) and polity (so-
cial power) dimensions. Transitional economies 
are undergoing tremendous economic changes at 
varying rates, and channels of distribution will be 
affected by both changes in external rules govern-
ing channels and corresponding changes in the 
distribution of power among stakeholder groups. 
Second, it implies that the motivation of channel 
members, or all stakeholders for that matter, is 
to maximize their level of resources and author-
ity. This suggests that stakeholders from the Com-
munist era will struggle to maintain their control 
over the allocation of resources and the distri-
bution of power, and that their success in doing 
so may be one factor that accelerates or retards 
channel change. 
The concept of interest domination assumes that 
stakeholders form homogeneous groups based on 
common interests and values. Therefore, while po-
litical economy provides the motivation for group 
behavior and lends justification for the interac-
tion between economic and political elements, net-
work concepts strengthen the analysis of how these 
groups accomplish their goals. 
Network Theory 
In the marketing literature, a network approach 
views firms or individuals as embedded within the 
channel’s social and political structure. Networks 
of firms or individuals provide value, in the form 
of trust, power, and resources (Anderson, Hakans-
son, and Johanson 1994; Thorelli 1986), that affects 
economic decision making (Granovetter 1985). Net-
works are accepted as a form of governance struc-
ture that falls between Williamson’s (1975, 1985) 
markets and hierarchies, providing more advan-
tages than either one in terms of overall utility 
(Heide 1994; Thorelli 1986; Williamson 1985). An-
derson, Hakansson, and Johanson (1994) argue that 
networks are an appropriate unit of channel anal-
ysis because transaction partners actually are con-
nected beyond the dyad to numerous other part-
ners, to the extent that changes in the circumstances 
of one party affect the other parties in the network, 
not just a single exchange partner. They suggest 
that, in a channel of distribution, the network con-
text mediates between the external (macro) envi-
ronment and the task (firm) environment. This is a 
significant recognition of the importance of analyz-
ing and understanding how individuals in market-
ing channels behave in groups or networks that are 
not firm based. 
In the context of channels in a transforming econ-
omy, a network consists of relationships among in-
dividuals involved in economic activity. The network 
is a collection of individuals; therefore, the unit of 
analysis can be the network or individuals acting in 
response to the network environment. A key issue 
is the ability of the group to “control” the economic 
activities of its members, because the ultimate eco-
nomic power rests with the group. Applying a net-
work perspective to the issue of channel changes in 
a transforming economy suggests that those net-
works of stakeholders that existed under the previ-
ous system may still provide access to resources and 
the power necessary to enhance one’s relative posi-
tion when the macro economic and political environ-
ments are unstable. Particularly when legal systems 
and institutions are nascent or nonexistent, network 
models suggest that managers may rely on informal 
support systems to realize their goals. 
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Ethnodomination 
Network models are just beginning to examine is-
sues of social change (Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993), and the concept of change has not been ex-
plored within the marketing literature on channel 
networks. Political economy, in turn, only suggests 
which variables are important in a changing envi-
ronment. Here, the literature on the ethnodomina-
tion of trade (Bonacich 1973; Smith 1976; Speece 
1990a, 1990b) is useful in providing evidence of the 
factors that are related to changes in trade channels 
dominated by networks of shared ethnicity. 
 Evidence of ethnodomination comes from devel-
oping countries where ethnic networks control both 
power and the distribution of resources, with result-
ing effects on sectoral policies that serve to main-
tain the domination. This discussion draws on the 
ethnodomination literature to develop the concept 
of interest domination to describe channel networks 
that act to accelerate or retard change in channel in-
stitutions. The process of opening ethnodominated 
channels incorporates elements of acculturation 
that are, the authors argue, analogous to the process 
of disseminating business knowledge and changing 
the entrepreneurial values of certain population seg-
ments within transitional economies. Ethnodomi-
nation studies also highlight the important effects 
of changes in regional economic and spatial policy 
on channel development. 
Figure 1. Theoretical bases of interest domination in transforming economies  
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Integration of Perspectives 
The approach in this article is distinct from stud-
ies that use market characteristics to explain chan-
nel structure and processes. Frazier and Kale (1989) 
suggest that relationships between manufacturers 
and distributors are different in sellers’ and buy-
ers’ markets as a result of differences in economic 
market antecedents. According to a political econ-
omy perspective, in sellers’ markets, manufactur-
ers dominate the channel because of supply con-
straints. This may be manifested in surface rather 
than deep relationships, increased use of coercive 
power, long-term supply relationships that preserve 
the status quo, and the use of efficiency over effec-
tiveness criteria in evaluating channel performance 
(Frazier and Kale 1989). As the economic environ-
ment of the sellers’ market opens to resources and 
competition, these behavioral relationships change. 
Transforming economies are in the process of mov-
ing from sellers’ to buyers’ markets in many indus-
tries, and this article focuses on the behavioral and 
political processes that accompany changes in mar-
ket structure. 
The authors approach channel control from a 
macromarketing perspective but recognize that the 
problems and evidence will be industry specific. Dis-
tribution channels may vary in the degree of conti-
nuity of management through the transition from 
complete continuity to complete change in man-
agement. Furthermore, the outcomes of domina-
tion may depend on the level of professional man-
agement expertise, the strength of old networks, 
industry norms, and the strength of organizational 
and personal objectives. 
Finally, this article argues that interests change 
over time, and the dominant group may change. 
The focus is on domination of trade channels by 
former managers, Communist cadres, or party 
elite, but the presence of many groups competing 
for power suggests that at some point additional 
perspectives on interest domination may be use-
ful. The key to understanding interest domina-
tion rests, not in labeling the dominant group, but 
in identifying how the group achieved dominance 
and whether the environmental change catalysts 
suggested herein as linked to change in dominated 
channels are present. 
The next section provides background informa-
tion on Hungary and Tajikistan, two contrasting ex-
amples of transitional economies in different stages 
of economic and market development, as a preface 
to the conceptual discussion of interest domination. 
Hungary and Tajikistan 
While this discussion is not intended as an empiri-
cal study and relies heavily upon existing literature 
in marketing and sociology, information collected 
during visits to Hungary and Tajikistan during the 
summers of 1994 and 1995 is used to reinforce the 
context and illustrate the propositions. 
Hungary is a Central European country with a 
population of 10.5 million. The Hungarian econ-
omy is considered one of the front runners in the 
emerging markets of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (Economist 1994). Unlike other countries 
in this region, Hungary has been very success-
ful in replacing former COMECON trading part-
ners and has attracted the lion’s share of foreign 
investment in the region. While it is difficult to 
generalize about the development of distribu-
tion channels in Hungary, the number of private 
wholesaling units has increased immensely since 
1989. Cash-and-carry warehouses supply smaller 
businesses; larger firms often buy directly from 
the manufacturer or have integrated many dis-
tribution functions. Interviews were conducted 
in Hungary in 1994 and 1995 with the managing 
directors of 11 companies engaged in consumer 
goods wholesaling and retailing. 
Tajikistan, a former republic of the Soviet Union, 
gained its independence in 1991. Its economy is in 
the early stages of transformation, and the distribu-
tion channels for most products are still in their in-
fancy. In the agricultural sector, the “bazaar” system 
is still common, with buyers and sellers of produce 
interacting in a large central marketplace. For man-
ufactured goods, complete collapse of the state-run 
system has created a vacuum in the distribution sec-
tor. A class of distribution entrepreneurs is slowly 
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emerging, but growth of the sector is severely hand-
icapped by the lack of such market institutions as 
commercial banking and legal infrastructure. As 
later examples in this article suggest, the people 
with power and connections (mostly members of 
the former Communist Party) are the ones who are 
able to succeed under these conditions. Given this 
background, Tajikistan provides an ideal setting for 
observing the role of interest domination. One of the 
authors spent three weeks there in summer 1994, 
visiting factories, farms, and collective enterprises 
and talking with businesspeople, government offi-
cials, and private citizens. 
Using the authors’ observations and other in-
formation gathered before and during these vis-
its to Hungary and Tajikistan, the next section of-
fers propositions to explain how interest-dominated 
channels develop in a command economy and how 
this domination may be sustained during the eco-
nomic transformation. 
The Bases of Interest Domination 
This section examines how two economies in trans-
formation from a command to a market system dif-
fer in terms of the level of domination by an insider 
group that we identify as former Communist cadres, 
managers, or party elite. Differences between Hun-
gary and Tajikistan in the success of economic de-
velopment policies, the level of foreign investment, 
the pace of acculturation of Western values, and po-
litical reforms are discussed, as are ways these vari-
ables may affect continuing cadre domination. 
The Role of the Planned Economy 
In the former planned economies of Hungary and Ta-
jikistan, planners determined outputs and then de-
veloped a matrix of the economy to identify the in-
puts needed to meet those goals. Channel objectives 
were to (1) rationalize the flow of goods from pro-
ducer to consumer, (2) minimize the number of han-
dling stages, and (3) assure the smooth and timely 
delivery of the appropriate assortment of goods 
through the channel (Gogol 1963). The channel was 
vertically integrated in the sense that the state was 
the sole owner of production and distribution, but 
the focus was on production. The distribution or 
trading function was always meant to be strictly sep-
arate from manufacturing. The major manufacturers 
were large and held monopoly control over the chan-
nel and their industry (Vegh 1993). 
Wholesalers served to move goods through the 
channel but did not add value; most value was 
added at the retail level (Jaworska 1992). There was 
no market scanning for new products or sources of 
supply, and credit was not offered within the chan-
nel. Referring to the textile market, one manager 
observed that domestic markets were unimportant, 
as the focus was on export trade with other COM-
ECON countries. Another manager reported that 
the expertise within these channels was.in the buy-
ing of imported goods and in bartering skills, not in 
market forecasting and selling. Satisfaction of cus-
tomers was not a transaction objective, and there 
was little competition from alternate vendors be-
cause competition was not a part of the plan. Thus, 
despite the official goals of distribution, there was 
no accountability for failure to deliver products 
in a coordinated, efficient, and timely manner be-
cause production was the only performance criteria. 
Channels in Hungary and Tajikistan, for example, 
were characterized by a high degree of concentra-
tion and centralization in resources and decision 
making, and they were excessively long in order to 
provide employment. 
When business policy was liberalized in 1968, ef-
ficiency became a concern; one example of reform 
was the rationalization of retail clothing outlets by a 
Hungarian textile company. Still, product differenti-
ation and assortment were not objectives; wholesale 
and retail markets were segmented by broad prod-
uct category and by geographic location, rather than 
by consumer needs and shopping patterns. For ex-
ample, Vegh (1993) reports that a small Hungarian 
shop might sell soap, underwear, beverages, ciga-
rettes, shirts, toys, and books. 
Government policies can affect channel struc-
ture and may be conducive to trade domination in 
several ways. Regional economic policies allocate 
money for infrastructure improvement and busi-
ness development, affecting the spatial develop-
ment of trade. The economic and spatial policies of 
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a planned economy are similar to those in countries 
where ethnodomination of marketing channels ex-
ists (Speece 1990a, 1990b). Smith (1974) and Speece 
(1990a, 1990b) describe ethnodominated channels 
as spatially dendritic market structures connecting 
smaller markets in the hinterland with progressively 
larger markets. The vertical nature of market trans-
actions precludes competition from enterprises in 
similar-sized trading cities in a specific product 
market. The hierarchical structure culminates in a 
single, large, export-oriented trade center. Because 
of the dendritic structure, small markets are depen-
dent on a single supplier or buyer; hence, the mo-
nopolistic character of the channel is preserved. As a 
result of these trading patterns, economic develop-
ment is slow and uneven, both spatially and among 
population segments (in terms of distribution of 
income). 
Spatially, the old Communist distribution chan-
nels could also be described as dendritic, with hi-
erarchical rather than vertical market supply link-
ages. During the days of strong central control in 
Hungary, the ministries dominated distribution 
channels, partly through regional economic de-
velopment policies. The distribution of the urban 
population was uneven; Budapest dominated trade 
markets at the top of a pyramid of cities, an arti-
fact of policies that concentrated development re-
sources. Despite later attempts to encourage more 
even growth, few medium-sized cities existed 
to serve as regional distribution centers (Bartke 
1989). Until recently, the distribution system had a 
wheel-like configuration, with transportation net-
works funneling all goods from smaller communi-
ties directly to Budapest. Now, new roads are being 
constructed to connect existing medium-sized cit-
ies, which could have major effects on trading pat-
terns and opportunities. Such regional inequities 
also may have affected the political clout of man-
agers from outlying areas. For example, according 
to Racz (1994), professional managers from other 
towns or villages have difficulty entering the Buda-
pest business community. 
The organizational and physical characteristics of 
distribution channels in planned economies suggest 
the first proposition. 
Proposition 1: Vertical supply linkages in 
distribution channels, such as those in 
planned economies, provide a structure 
that is conducive to interest domination. 
While these organizational and physical charac-
teristics facilitated interest domination, the charac-
teristics of the group itself or its social structure rep-
resent the fundamental variable in explaining how 
these networks originated and are sustained. The 
next section looks at these issues. 
Social Networks 
The control system of the command economy was 
based on strong networks of individuals sharing a 
common political and economic philosophy. This 
section identifies two characteristics of networks 
that contribute to interest domination. The first is 
the isolation of the group from the general popula-
tion, and the second is group cohesiveness. The lat-
ter, it is suggested, permits group control over ac-
cess to valuable resources through the concept of 
enforceable trust. 
In ethnodominated channels, the evolution of 
control within the channel is based on strong cul-
tural ties. Bonacich (1973), Smith (1974), and Sow-
ell (1994) describe the special characteristics of eth-
nic groups that exercise monopoly channel control. 
Sowell (1994) suggests that the distinct entrepre-
neurial values of these groups isolate them from the 
indigenous population. Bonacich (1973) and Smith 
(1974) describe sojourners who, in addition to their 
entrepreneurial values, have a strong attachment 
to their home culture and maintain a separate cul-
tural identity. These groups represent a closely knit 
community, sharing and preserving common val-
ues and economic goals. One might expect strong, 
closed communications networks based on com-
mon interests and weak ties to the host culture be-
cause of the isolation of the group ethnically, cultur-
ally, and economically. Portes and Sensenbrenner 
(1993) suggest that isolation contributes to the sol-
idarity of the group, which aids the group in devel-
oping and sustaining economic reciprocity. They 
further assert that as isolation becomes more pro-
nounced, solidarity increases, barriers to exit 
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increase, and subsequently isolation and solidarity 
are strengthened. 
In interest-dominated channels, isolation may 
be based, not on ethnic differences, but on a politi-
cal and managerial culture or on the expertise, val-
ues, experiences, and social networks that bind the 
managerial elite and distinguish them from other 
groups. For example, Nagy (1993) describes the 
‘’inbreeding’’ that occurred among Hungarian tech-
nocrats and managers during the 1980s, such that 
managerial skills could only be acquired in a man-
agerial position, and lateral reassignment replaced 
upward mobility as a career pattern. He labels these 
groups the “new bourgeoisie” because they began 
to accumulate personal wealth in a socialist soci-
ety, and he suggests that this “embourgeoisiement” 
occurred under odd conditions-a monopoly market 
and a hierarchical communication and management 
structure. The only “oddity,” however, stems from 
an attitude—behavior inconsistency. From a purely 
economic perspective, the behavior was the mani-
festation of an insider coalition’s goal of accumulat-
ing control of resources and power and the ability 
of the group to “control” the behavior of individual 
members to perpetuate its economic position. 
Nagy’s (1993) comments are themselves indic-
ative of a split between social groups—those who 
profited from their positions during the early days 
of the transformation and those who did not be-
cause they were not part of the network. Portes and 
Sensenbrenner’s (1993) insights about the solidar-
ity of immigrant groups suggest that interest dom-
ination has been affected by, not only the presence 
of these groups, but also the degree to which the 
in-group is polarized or isolated from other social 
groups, during both Communist rule and the ensu-
ing economic transformation. Isolation is also re-
lated to economic success; the success of the in-
group during the transformation will continue to 
isolate them from the out-groups and sustain their 
power and economic advantage. This leads to the 
second proposition. 
Proposition 2: Isolation of the dominant interest 
group from the rest of society contributes to 
interest domination and to the continuing 
economic success of the dominant group. 
Access to Resources 
Instrumental to the value of networks is the ability 
of in-group members to provide one another with 
access to resources that enhance economic power. 
Under the planned economy, social relationships 
arose to facilitate transactions, often outside offi-
cial channels (Nagy 1993; R6nas-Tas 1991, 1994; 
Stark 1990,1992). For example, during a shortage, 
a connection to a wholesaler might be essential to 
providing sufficient product to meet sales targets. 
Nagy (1993) argues that new business forms and 
institutions have preserved the information power 
and relational structures of former exchange net-
works in Hungary because “the cohesive force is 
no longer a shared ideology but shared interests” 
(p. 83). Thus, the tie that binds has changed from 
commitment to a philosophy to protecting and en-
hancing economic turf, although some would ar-
gue that the pursuit of economic self-interest has 
always been the underlying goal. This descrip-
tion agrees with the “power conversion” thesis de-
scribed by R6nas-Tas (1994) or the “political cap-
italism” of Staniszkis (1991), which suggests that 
cadres were able to use their official positions in 
the waning days of the old system to acquire assets 
in the new market economy. 
One explanation for the apparent sustained value 
of cadre connections is what Portes and Sensen-
brenner (1993) call enforceable trust. In their anal-
ysis of the social capital of immigrant groups, they 
identify enforceable trust as community expecta-
tions that affect economic goals and goal-seeking 
behavior. The community has the power to sanction 
or reward the behavior of its members by providing 
or denying access to important economic resources. 
The trust involved is the knowledge that community 
members will follow community rules; enforcement 
comes from the ability of the group to withhold or 
provide resources. Kadushin (1995) points out that 
enforceable trust extends beyond the dyad and is re-
ally a web or network phenomenon. 
Róna-Tas (1994) offers empirical support for no-
tion that the value of former Party connections in 
current business transactions may be interpreted as 
social capital in the form of enforceable trust. Based 
on self-reported responses to a random survey of 
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Hungarians conducted in 1991, he found that for-
mer cadre (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party) 
members were more likely to be engaged in corpo-
rate business than were nonmembers. This relation-
ship persisted even when education was entered 
into the model. 
In contrast, while former cadres participated 
in noncorporate, entrepreneurial positions and in 
farming to a greater extent than did noncadres, hu-
man rather than political capital was the explana-
tion. Education accounted for the variation between 
the groups in participation in farming and noncor-
porate ventures and in reported income from these 
activities. For cadres in corporate business, how-
ever, cadre status contributed to income differen-
tials that could not be accounted for by differences 
in education. These findings support our conten-
tion that, for some groups, past associations provide 
economic value in specific contemporary contexts. 
This value can come from enhanced access to prop-
erty and business opportunities arising from the po-
litical process or through the benefits provided by 
the networks of personal, political, and business 
relationships. 
Current business relationships seem to be a mat-
ter of trust in Hungary, in terms of access to both 
capital and supplies. As one successful entrepre-
neur commented, “My 20-year reputation is my 
capital. People trust my word.” This individual had 
managed to use his network connections to attract 
sufficient capital to build and operate a multimil-
lion-dollar wholesale market in Budapest. In Ta-
jikistan, where obtaining credit from a bank is vir-
tually impossible, entrepreneurs rely on members 
of the social network or family for access to capi-
tal. The trust involved is more than the interper-
sonal trust between the parties; it rests with one’s 
reputation and standing within a broader group 
of connections. One value of the trust is the con-
tinued access to resources. This suggests the third 
proposition. 
Proposition 3: Interest domination enhances the 
ability of the network to sustain enforceable 
trust by continuing to provide access to eco-
nomic resources to its members. 
Environmental Variables 
Underlying the concept of trust is its antithesis- dis-
trust. The environment in many transforming econ-
omies is so fraught with mistrust and dishonesty 
that trusted networks are especially valued. One 
wholesaler from Veszprem, in Hungary, reported 
that his firm spends considerable time and money 
evaluating potential suppliers because of unfortu-
nate experiences with dishonest traders. Therefore, 
if one is a member of a network characterized by en-
forceable trust, the network has value beyond that 
of the tangible resources that membership provides. 
The value of the network is again instrumental; it 
may be integral to expediting transactions under 
varying degrees and kinds of uncertainty. 
Without a system of contract law to protect in-
vestments and a banking system to arrange and 
guarantee equal access to credit, being connected to 
the “right” network may be an important advantage 
and, in some cases, the only means of entrance into 
the business community. Sowell (1994) offers evi-
dence that trust among middleman minorities can 
replace the need for written contracts. We suggest 
that these channel networks function as transac-
tion governance structures because the social cap-
ital and trust within the network provide rules for 
conducting and monitoring economic transactions. 
The fourth proposition is as follows: 
Proposition 4: Interest domination is sustained 
by an environment in which other mecha-
nisms for governing transactions, such as 
a legal and regulatory framework, are un-
available or underdeveloped. 
The Dimensions of Change 
Writing in the context of ethnodominated channels, 
Speece (1990a, 1990b) notes that domination can 
change (1) as government policies become more 
focused on economic development, (2) as accultur-
ation occurs and the population majority becomes 
more entrepreneurial, and (3) as barriers to entry in 
the retail sector fall. The authors suggest that a sim-
ilar process occurs in interest-dominated channels, 
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depending on the degrees of change in the policy, 
social, and resource dimensions. These dimensions 
are change catalysts; they represent the interaction 
of forces, both external and internal to the in-group. 
The process and outcomes of change in Hungary 
have been different from those in Tajikistan, where 
progress toward a market economy has been much 
slower. Tajikistan does not have a history of early 
economic reform under the Communist Party, as 
Hungary does. This suggests that interest domina-
tion may be more visible in Tajik marketing chan-
nels because the factors we identify as leading to 
change in these channels are not found in Tajikistan 
to the same extent as in Hungary. 
Sustained Control over Government 
Policies 
The external political and economic environment 
can affect channel structure (Dwyer and Oh 1988; 
Dwyer and Welsh 1985; Heide and John 1990; 
Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990; Sharma and Domin-
guez 1992). In a transforming economy, government 
policies aimed at encouraging economic develop-
ment can influence changes in interest-dominated 
channels. Policies can include, for example, the in-
frastructure improvements in Hungary that should 
change trading patterns, increase market options, 
and alter policies regarding the privatization of 
state-owned assets. The process of privatization also 
can perpetuate channel domination by the in-group, 
when the group is able to influence public policy and 
exclude outsiders from ownership opportunities. In 
this sense, the in-group can drive external change 
while protecting their position. Assuming that the 
group already controls public policy, as in a cadre-
run political system, the change catalyst is the open-
ing of the political arena to other interest groups. 
The privatization experience of Hungary illus-
trates both consolidated and diffuse control. In 
1988, the momentum toward privatization culmi-
nated in the Act of Association, the legal frame-
work for the transfer of ownership interests of state-
owned assets. According to Mihalyi (1993), Nagy 
(1993), and Voszka (1991), the legislation resulted 
in what became known as “spontaneous privatiza-
tion,” or the transfer of ownership of the profitable 
assets of state companies to managers, foreign in-
terests, and holding companies, often at bargain 
basement prices. Voszka (1991) suggests that artifi-
cial ownership structures perpetuated control by ex-
isting managers and resulted in the failure to create 
strong private market interests. 
The chief executive officer of a large retail cloth-
ing company in Hungry described the process of 
privatization in general and explained how, in 1989, 
each state-owned company was required to estab-
lish a board of directors. Many companies chose po-
litical allies and friends to be on the board, and the 
result was a “quasi-ownership” arrangement where 
the board approved the actions of managers and 
“everyone made money,” but there were no outside 
owners, no ‘’real owners” who were financially af-
fected by performance. 
Pasztor (1991) offers a detailed description of 
the privatization of Apisz, a successful stationery 
and paper products business, that resulted in con-
solidated control over distribution channels. This 
can be traced to public policies that encouraged 
“chain” operations. Managers were told by the State 
Property Agency that companies owning “chains” 
of retail outlets would be favored in privatization 
decisions, and the result has been ownership con-
solidation and vertical integration. Proponents see 
this as necessary to creating a base for retail growth, 
but the policy also may undermine small business 
development. 
While the Hungarian public is aware of question-
able transfers of power and wealth, and while writ-
ers like Nagy (1993), Pasztor (1991), and Voszka 
(1991) are now free to address the issue, the pro-
cess has not been entirely smooth. One Hungarian 
professional commented that “these topics are not 
too much welcomed. We had a peaceful change, and 
this is the price we paid for a peaceful change.” A 
college-level teacher commented that for many peo-
ple there is little difference between the Commu-
nists and the capitalists-the economic outcomes for 
the majority appear to be the same. This seems to 
echo the “paradox of capitalism” described by Arndt 
(1981), which can occur when stakeholder groups 
succeed in eliminating competition while simulta-
neously professing to be true believers in the mar-
ket system. 
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Privatization in Hungary has created numerous 
other ownership coalitions. It is sometimes diffi-
cult to trace the actual owners of a firm and their 
percentage of ownership. Coalitions of manag-
ers, bankers, and local governments represent ac-
cess to the necessary resources to continue opera-
tions, but the long-term effects of these coalitions 
are unclear. Local governments remain powerful 
forces in privatization decisions, as they own prop-
erty, and difficulties have arisen in clearing prop-
erty rights for transfer. Furthermore, according to 
those interviewed, local government control over re-
tail locations is a major stumbling block to the de-
velopment of small business. Critics charge that 
long-term lease rates have been exorbitant and fail 
to reflect market value. Whether this is tied to inter-
est domination is uncertain. It may reflect the de-
sire of local politicians to generate wealth, or it may 
indicate that local government policies are at odds 
with a general emphasis on economic development. 
In Tajikistan, constant political turmoil and the 
continued dominance of former Communist offi-
cials have slowed the process of general economic 
reform. There are still three ownership forms: state-
owned companies, cooperative farms, and stock 
companies. Observers report that the latter are for-
mer state-owned firms that have been privatized, 
whose ownership has been transferred to mana-
gerial groups. From all appearances, the transfers 
were effected by former Communist Party members 
in government with whom the managers had main-
tained or formed social/political networks. Priva-
tization rules favor the status quo, and managers 
have been able to retain control. Sources of capital 
are also based on these networks. 
The fifth proposition is based on the experiences 
in Hungary and Tajikistan relating to the transfer of 
political power during the transformation. 
Proposition 5: Interest domination is sustained 
by the ability of the in-group to control 
public policy affecting channel and eco-
nomic development. 
The next section suggests that a pattern of inter-
est domination may be altered when other groups 
develop the political and economic power to change 
policies that have perpetuated insider ownership of 
assets and access to markets. 
Resource Alternatives 
Isolation of the in-group has been identified as a 
factor leading to the continuation of interest dom-
ination. The degree of isolation is related to the 
openness of the market to foreign participants who 
provide both outside capital and new ways of do-
ing business. As Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) 
argue, the ability of a group to sustain enforceable 
trust is inversely related to the options for economic 
opportunity available outside the focal community. 
This section offers evidence that supports their con-
tention in the context of a transforming economy 
by examining the effect of multinational companies 
(MNCs), trade policies, and world trading agencies 
on marketing channels. These forces affect channel 
domination through their influence on public policy 
and by bringing new ideas and ways of doing busi-
ness and providing an alternative source of capital 
and other types of assistance to both in-group mem-
bers and outsiders. 
The Hungarian economy was open to foreign in-
vestment before the economic and political changes 
of 1989, but it has grown dramatically since then 
(Economist 1994). As MNCs bring external resources 
for local development, they acquire considerable in-
fluence in government and business decisions. This 
may result in an opening of interest-dominated chan-
nels as new players emerge, or it may solidify and 
entrench the current elite through the formation of 
powerful coalitions with outside owners. The decid-
ing factors may be the effects of MNC entry on in-
dustry concentration and competition. If a previously 
dominated channel remains competitive, and control 
is dispersed among several players, it can change. In 
Hungary, the perception of a new kind of domination 
by foreigners is a concern. One respondent used na-
tionality to describe channels with considerable for-
eign ownership, such as the “Austrian” retail food 
products channel. Similarly, products manufactured 
by Hungarian firms with multinational ownership 
are no longer viewed as “Hungarian.” 
Multinationals or entrepreneurs from outside 
groups also provide capital, information, and other 
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types of business assistance to the local population. 
This outside assistance gives members of the in-
group an alternative pool of resources that weakens 
in-group ties and may provide outgroup members 
with the assistance necessary to begin a meaning-
ful business endeavor. This fits, in part, Speece’s 
(1990a, 1990b) description of the opening of the re-
tail sector. In dominated channels where supply re-
strictions have been relaxed, outsiders may have ac-
cess to supplies and limited capital to begin small 
retail enterprises, but many of these remain at the 
subsistence level because sufficient resources and 
knowledge are not available locally to promote real 
growth of the retail sector. 
In Tajikistan, in contrast to Hungary, foreign do-
mestic investment is small. This is in part a function 
of the uncertain legal and regulatory infrastructure; 
while laws governing foreign investment exist, the 
government instability makes it unclear whether they 
will be enforced or changed. Members of the in-group, 
however, have international connections developed 
through their political positions, and thus have access 
to travel documents, goods, and capital. Private trad-
ers with connections charter airplanes and buy goods 
abroad for domestic resale at a substantial profit. In-
group membership is integral to one’s personal eco-
nomic success, and the role of the group in enforc-
ing trust among its members is sustained, in part, 
because the external environment is not conducive to 
the development of alternatives. Proposition 6 sum-
marizes the effect of resource alternatives. 
Proposition 6: In the absence of a coalition be-
tween the in-group and international trad-
ers, the involvement of international trad-
ing groups in the local economy may 
a) weaken interest domination by the in-
group, and 
b) contribute to a breakdown of enforceable 
trust within the in-group. 
The Social Process of Assimilating 
Business Values 
The degree to which an economy is open to global 
trade is related to the final change catalyst, the 
social process of changing business values. In 
ethnodominated channels, acculturation repre-
sents a two-way exchange of cultural and business 
values. For example, in Thailand, Chinese Thais ini-
tially were more entrepreneurial than the indige-
nous Thais, but through acculturation have become 
more like them culturally, while the latter have ad-
opted the entrepreneurial values of the Chinese mi-
nority (Gentry, Jun, and Tansuhaj 1995; Thorelli 
and Sentell 1982). 
In interest-dominated channels, acculturation may 
be largely unidirectional. Groups with a monopoly 
on business skills and entrepreneurial values have to 
transfer these to the population at large for assim-
ilation of business values to occur, a process much 
like acculturation. Traditional socialist values favored 
societal gain over personal gain; there have been re-
ports of resistance to capitalism among groups in 
transforming economies that goes beyond resistance 
to the current regime. In a sense, this represents a 
cultural lag, that is, the system is changing more rap-
idly than people’s attitudes and values. 
As the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
move toward social democracies and capitalist econ-
omies, one challenge is to achieve a balance between 
the right of individuals to gain from production and 
the need for contributions to programs that benefit 
society as a whole. In Hungary, assimilation may in-
volve the transfer of business knowledge and skills 
more than a change in social and entrepreneurial val-
ues. This seems to fit with the findings of Róna-Tas 
(1994) on the success of cadres in business endeavors. 
For example, one manager reported that it was ex-
tremely difficult to convince traders in a large whole-
sale market about the value of differentiating their 
businesses with signage and providing other kinds of 
information to prospective buyers. Public policy deci-
sions regarding the funding of business training pro-
grams also affect the transfer of business knowledge. 
In Tajikistan, interviews revealed very limited 
knowledge, at the enterprise level, of the role of 
profit in business management. Even in firms with 
foreign ownership, there appeared to be little as-
similation of entrepreneurial values; foreigners and 
natives seemed capable of maintaining their sepa-
rate knowledge and value systems. The process of 
assimilation in Tajikistan may be initiated as the 
children of elite managers are educated abroad and 
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bring business knowledge back home, but this does 
not mean that entrepreneurial values will diffuse be-
yond the in-group. 
This discussion leads to the final proposition. 
Proposition 7: The continuation of interest dom-
ination is inversely related to the rate of as-
similation of entrepreneurial values. 
Contributions and Future Issues 
This article provides a framework for looking at the 
process of change in marketing channels in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The concept of interest domi-
nation is presented as a variable that moderates the 
relationship between the external, or macro, world 
and the firm environment and can accelerate or re-
tard change. In summarizing the framework, several 
important points should be emphasized. 
Contributions of the Model 
Catalysts to Change 
One contribution of the framework described in this 
article is the identification of factors in the external 
political environment that are catalysts to channel 
change. As Robicheaux and Coleman (1994) point 
out, this particular area of channel research has been 
neglected. This model represents a first step toward 
further investigation of the external influences on 
channel change in the context of influence patterns. 
Cultural Lag 
An important concept in the process of change in 
interest-dominated channels, cultural lag, suggests 
that behavioral elements lag behind economic ones. 
Even as seller’s markets are changing to buyers’ 
markets, people try to preserve old behavioral pat-
terns and cling to outdated values and suspicions. 
Valuable Skills 
The process of change can be positive if the value of 
experience and skills developed under the socialist 
system is recognized and if outsiders understand the 
role of personal networks in reducing uncertainty 
in the current environment. Interest domination, 
in the long run, may be an important facilitator of 
change. 
Role of Government 
In transforming economies, governments play an 
extremely important role in the process of change 
and can be a determining factor in whether inter-
est domination will continue. Reports of corruption 
among business and government officials must be 
understood within the framework of change and the 
desire of those involved to preserve and protect re-
sources and authority and reduce uncertainty. 
Predictive Value 
Interest domination is an important variable in the 
rate of change in transforming economies. By con-
firming or denying the existence of factors that sus-
tain or reduce interest domination, marketing re-
searchers can predict how quickly change may occur 
and then develop strategies to direct the process. 
Individual Actors 
Interest domination focuses on relationships among 
individuals that cut across firm boundaries. While 
the relationship of the individual to the group is in-
tegral in perpetuating domination, the individual is 
the economic actor making decisions. Research on 
the social context of trade relationships has focused 
on the firm, rather than the individual, as the unit 
of analysis (Anderson, Hakansson, and Johanson 
1994). Interest domination suggests that this may 
not be the appropriate approach in certain contexts, 
such as a transforming economy. 
Stark (1990) describes cohesive networks of 
trust, cross-ownership, and stable contracting that 
he asserts function similarly to Japanese business 
networks, in which interpersonal relationships 
are crucial. The authors argue that, in the Hun-
garian context, there is little or no firm identity as 
yet. The larger firms were state-owned, but “deals” 
were made between individuals.  Small firms in the 
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former second economy were represented by the in-
dividual entrepreneur. While larger firms with for-
eign ownership are trying to build firm identity, in 
many cases this identity is still securely tied to own-
ers or managers (Dahab 1995; Stark 1990). 
MNCs as Powerful Players 
Finally, with the increasing importance of world 
trade to these economies, governments may find 
their role diminished by the power of MNCs and 
world trading organizations. Boddewyn and Brewer 
(1994) suggest that, in a global trading environ-
ment, MNCs approach governments as resources 
to be controlled, rather than as constraints to activ-
ities. This may be particularly applicable in trans-
forming economies struggling to enter global mar-
kets rapidly and to halt rising external debt and 
growing trade imbalances. 
Future Efforts 
It is important to approach research and manage-
ment issues regarding Central and Eastern Europe 
with three caveats. First, a Western orientation may 
not be appropriate for either academic analysis or 
managerial decision making. Nason, Carman, and 
Dholakia (1992) emphasize this point when they 
suggest that channel mapping to document exist-
ing transaction patterns and relationships should 
precede normative research. The ethnodomination 
studies by Speece (1990a, 1990b) also demonstrate 
that non-Western models are appropriate for study-
ing channel operations and change in underdevel-
oped countries. 
Second, the political and economic situation in 
Hungary and throughout Eastern Europe is dy-
namic and affects channel decisions. The writings 
of Denitch (1992) and others suggest that the “poli-
tocracies” of the socialist era may be flourishing in 
capitalist guise. Denitch’s (1992) arguments about 
the “Mexicanization” of Central and Eastern Europe 
focus on the potential for a dual economy composed 
of the managerial elite and a subsistence labor class. 
This concept is strikingly similar to ethnodom-
inated outcomes. Ethnodomination provides the 
framework for looking at what could happen in 
Central and Eastern Europe if the politocracy con-
tinues, and it also provides guidance on how change 
may occur. Interest domination of marketing chan-
nels is one manifestation of tightly held political 
and economic power. Integral to change in interest-
dominated channels are the assimilation of business 
knowledge and values by the general population 
from the entrepreneurial elite and broader access to 
capital resources. Recognizing that change will oc-
cur and using public policies to guide the process is 
one approach. As trade barriers fall and markets de-
velop, one concern is that indigenous firms will not 
be able to compete with MNCs, and the result may 
be the loss of local jobs. This has a direct effect on 
channel decisions. 
In the face of political and economic uncertainties 
and the lack of entrepreneurial experience in Hun-
gary, Tajikistan, and other Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, MNCs have difficult decisions to 
make regarding channel selection. Many have cho-
sen to develop their own distribution systems, some 
have been able to work with local entrepreneurs, and 
others have built alliances with state-owned or newly 
privatized companies (Dahab, Marquardt, and Gen-
try 1994). Speece (1990b) suggests that it is impor-
tant for MNCs to work within the system, that is, to 
use local channels whenever possible to enter the 
market. Considering the prevailing sentiment and 
concerns about foreign competition, firms that use 
local suppliers or distributors may have at least a po-
litical advantage over those with their own channels. 
Finally, it is important to understand the process 
of assimilation and how it applies to Central and 
Eastern Europe. Ignoring the expertise of techno-
crats or managers because of their prior connections 
may not be an efficient way to build a solid base for 
a new economy. As Speece (1990b) suggests within 
the context of ethnodominated channels, purging 
old institutions, values, and resources without hav-
ing replacements is unwise. Recognizing them and 
incorporating them into a strategy is more prudent. 
Conclusions 
The focus of marketing research on Eastern Europe 
thus far seems to be on understanding developing 
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markets, rather than the role of marketing in eco-
nomic development. This article integrates the two 
perspectives by exploring how channel domination 
can affect market structure, which is related to eco-
nomic development. The concept of interest dom-
ination can help explain and predict the changes 
occurring in distribution channels in transforming 
economies. 
This article suggests that managerial carryover 
from the Communist era and the delineation of 
other cohesive group interests may be affecting cur-
rent distribution decisions. The outcomes may in-
clude monopolistic structures, higher prices, a lower 
supply response, and uneven distribution of income 
before adjustments. Countries such as Hungary, 
where economic progress has been rapid and polit-
ical reforms have been extensive, may not demon-
strate the level of interest domination of marketing 
channels found in a less developed market econ-
omy, such as Tajikistan. In Hungary, barriers to en-
try in retail and wholesale sectors are falling and a 
regrouping of business relationships is occurring. 
The process of assimilating business values may be 
slow. Public policies can help by stimulating devel-
opment of small and medium enterprises. Eventu-
ally, business relationships will adjust to the new 
climate. 
Finally, understanding the process of change in 
interest-dominated channels can enhance invest-
ment opportunities and business outcomes. Knowl-
edge of how these channels change through the pro-
cess of assimilation offers marketers a framework 
for evaluating channel decisions, as well as future 
opportunities for research regarding how public pol-
icies, social ties, shared experiences, and relation-
ships affect both channel decisions and economic 
outcomes. 
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